Ethics in rehearsal by Keenan, Bernard & Pottage, Alain
  
Bernard Keenan and Alain Pottage 
Ethics in rehearsal 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Keenan, Bernard and Pottage, Alain (2017) Ethics in rehearsal. Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute . ISSN 1359-0987 
 
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9655.12600 
 
© 2017 Royal Anthropological Institute 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69199/  
 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
]RUNNING HEADS 
VERSO: BERNARD KEENAN & ALAIN POTTAGE 
RECTO: ETHICS IN REHEARSAL[ 
 
]t1[Ethics in rehearsal 
]t2[BERNARD KEENAN & ALAIN POTTAGE  
]t3[London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
]abs[In this essay we explore a rather spare kind of meeting: a conversation 
between three people with minimal facilitating equipment. The stakes are high 
because these are meetings in which the barrister in an asylum or immigration 
case first meets with a client who is at risk of deportation. We focus on two 
dimensions of these encounters. First, we identify the aesthetic that configures 
and animates most asylum cases: the aesthetic of inconsistency. The meetings 
we observed were all about inconsistency; about working out how to respond 
to actual and anticipated challenges to the coherence of a refugee or migrant’s 
personal narrative. The logic of inconsistency is so persistent and so corrosive 
that the exercise of anticipation – ‘rehearsal’ – is essentially open-ended. This 
leads to the second dimension of our meetings. Barristers who work in this 
area of law develop a particular style or ethos, which allows them to 
accompany vulnerable clients through the rehearsal and also to make sense of 
their own involvement in the machinery of deportation. In these two aspects 
we find the basic choreographic principles of our meetings: the articulations 
which shape their material and affective ecology, and which inform the 
barrister’s interpretation and performance of his or her professional role. 
 
 
 
]p[According to a practitioner who had recently left the fold, lawyers who dedicate 
their professional lives to representing refugees risk becoming ‘either martyrs or 
ironists’. How does one engage with a system in which a popular discourse of 
radical suspicion functions as bureaucratic infrastructure? And how is a lawyer to 
deal with the routine documentary products of this machinery: letters of refusal in 
which selected parts of a refugee’s story are arbitrarily recomposed so as to suggest 
logical contradiction, inconsistency, and lack of credibility? We know that these 
letters have little to do with the lived experiences of refugees; for the lawyer, the 
problem is how to bring law to bear on texts that are often just pastiches of legal 
logic. It seems that for the bureaucrats who compile these letters the ritual formula of 
refusal – ‘it is not accepted that’ – is all the argument that is needed. And to some 
extent that is so, because in the UK, the refusal of an asylum application by a Home 
Office caseworker leaves the refugee with recourse to an appeal mechanism whose 
effectiveness has been compromised by reforms which were expressly designed to 
expedite deportation, and by cuts to the legal aid budget which have further reduced 
the involvement of lawyers.1 In terms of the broad structure of the asylum process, 
the role of lawyers was already more marginal that one might have supposed, but 
the effect of these changes is further to reinforce a structural effect of alienation.  
 ]p1[Many lawyers were drawn to working with refugees because they 
wanted ‘to make a difference’. The barrister who convened the meeting around 
which this essay is framed expressed this vocation very eloquently:  
 
]ex/[I had no doubt in my mind about it being the right thing to do, in every 
case. Even if people were crazy rapists or whatever, I didn’t think it was better 
to send them to Congo, for example, where women live without proper police 
or probation services or whatever a rapist needs [to not reoffend]. So even in 
the worst immigration cases, I still always felt that what I was doing was 
right.]/ex[  
 
]p[How does one work out a professional style that reconciles this kind of normative 
commitment with the indifference of bureaucratic machinery? This is a classically 
ethical question, which we explore by way of a study of a particular kind of meeting: 
the case conference in which the barrister retained to represent a refugee at a 
forthcoming hearing meets the client and the solicitor.  
 ]p1[The lawyer’s mode of engagement, his or her ethical style, will depend in 
the first instance on which branch of the profession he or she inhabits. In the English 
legal system, the solicitor will accompany the refugee from a relatively early stage in 
the case through to the final disposition, and may become much more familiar with 
the refugee, with their circumstances, and perhaps their broader community. The 
barrister will usually meet the refugee for the first time in the case conference, which, 
now that access to legal aid is so severely restricted, is likely to be held in the 
moments before the hearing itself. There is some latitude in the way that lawyers use 
the term ‘conference’, but most of the practitioners we observed insisted on using it 
only for the classic encounter between solicitor, client, and barrister. This is a simple 
form of meeting, which rarely involves more than four people (the client, two 
lawyers, and an interpreter), and which is contextualized by the most minimal 
equipment. But our hunch is that some interesting insights into law and lawyering 
emerge from the observation of these encounters.  
 ]p1[Case conferences might be unfolded as sociotechnical assemblages. They 
involve the repertoire of frames, infrastructures, and techniques that has been 
anatomized in recent ethnographies of legal form (see notably Riles 2010), and 
analysis might be scaled up or down, from the procedural regime of asylum law to 
the now-classic form of the file. In the course of our observations, two forms 
emerged as particularly intriguing principles of articulation. First, taking our cue 
from Thomas Scheffer’s discussion of ‘styles’ of lawyering, we started out with the 
notion that ethics played an interestingly complex role in the articulation of the 
conference. In his study of how case files function as infrastructure for very distinct 
professional styles,2 Scheffer notices how ethics (in the sense of an affective or 
normative disposition) is wired into contexts: ‘[H]abitus turns into a disposition that 
is supported by a local infrastructure of corresponding artefacts’ (2007: 71). Style is 
‘infrastructured’ by, and in turn acts as infrastructure for, the elements that are 
‘convened’3 in a case conference.4 Ethics in this particular sense remains the 
‘medium’ of our study. At the same time, however, we noticed the persistence of a 
particular legal aesthetic – inconsistency – which seemed to be articulated into 
almost all the observable elements of the conference, from the materiality of the 
documentation to the ethos of the practitioners. This aesthetic is interesting because 
it suggests a mode of technicality which is distinguishable from sociotechnical 
inflection. So although we retain ‘ethics’ as the rubric of our study, we take 
lawyering style as a medium in which the agency of this technical armature becomes 
manifest.  
 
  
]ha[Inconsistency  
]p[The only evidence that many asylum seekers can offer in support of their 
application is a story held in their head – a recollected narrative of persecution and 
flight.5 There is no witness evidence to enrich or corroborate their version of events, 
and no contextualizing evidence other than official compilations of information 
about the political situation in the ‘country of origin’.6 For refugees seeking asylum 
in the United Kingdom, the procedural chain that leads to the appeal tribunal (and 
hence the kind of case conference that we observed) begins with a screening 
interview, either with an Immigration Officer at a port of entry or with a Home 
Office official at the centre in Croydon. The training given to immigration officers 
emphasizes the forensic significance of contradictions or inconsistencies: ‘Point out 
the discrepancies, that is your job, find out the discrepancies in what they say and 
decide’ (cited in Jubany 2011: 80). The screening interview, which is supposed to be 
about gathering information rather than making decisions, is followed by an 
interview with a Home Office caseworker, who will make a decision on the 
application. In the letters of refusal which follow most of these interviews, grounds 
for refusal of an application are typically elicited from the tissue of the story itself, 
and formulated in terms of ‘inconsistency’ between different parts or iterations of the 
narrative. Indeed, the rhetoric of inconsistency has become so automatic that Home 
Office caseworkers often characterize propositions as inconsistent when they quite 
plainly are not. Of course, legal cases usually turn on judgements as to the 
consistency, plausibility, or credibility of a factual narrative, but in asylum procedure 
‘inconsistency’ becomes a particularly persistent and pernicious device.  
 ]p1[Inconsistency is carried forward throughout the case as a device that 
functions at once synchronically and diachronically; it articulates the elements within 
each phase (interview, consultation, conference, hearing) and relays each phase to 
the next. So, for example, the object of the conference is to formulate, within the 
temporal frame of the meeting, a witness statement which retrospectively engages 
the arguments made in the Home Office letter of refusal, and which does so in terms 
which also anticipate the rejoinders that are likely to be made in the tribunal by the 
Home Office advocate and the inquiries that the judge might pursue. In that sense, 
inconsistency is always ‘in rehearsal’. Inconsistency, and the hermeneutical style that 
actualizes it, is apt to disclose gaps and contradictions anywhere and everywhere. 
Indeed, in asylum cases the bottom line is a tragic irony: an account of persecution 
that presents no obvious inconsistencies will itself be said to be inconsistent with the 
traumatized state of the ‘real’ refugee. So no narrative can ever be intrinsically 
complete. When it happens, the ‘resolution’ of inconsistency is often the effect of a 
singular event which eclipses the narrative as ‘a whole’: on one side the ‘gotcha’7 
moment in which the applicant is betrayed by a flagrant contradiction; on the other, 
the moment in which a single detail emerges from the narrative so as to ‘absolve’ 
inconsistency (here we fuse the familiar meaning with the archaic sense of absolution 
as resolution).8 
 ]p1[How is ethics implicated in this machinery? To begin with, there is a 
rather obvious sense in which the subjectivity (or ethos) of the refugee is implicated 
in the discourse of gaps and contradictions. The barrister who convened the 
conference that serves as the narrative frame for this essay told us that she saw her 
role as being to detach the refugee from the logic of the letter of refusal:  
 
]ex/[[A] surprising number, given the culture of disbelief, most people are 
telling the truth in their cases, you know? And the problem is that they’re 
battered down by this system. And often the more important thing is about not 
getting people to respond to the ridiculous logic of refusal letters. The problem 
is people take it on, they take on the wild crazy reasons for why they’re not … 
then they try to explain them, and trying to explain them, that’s what makes 
them sound not credible.]/ex[ 
 
]p[The barrister insulates the client from the Home Office narrative by characterizing 
the allegation of non-credibility as a technical problem to be addressed and resolved 
through the presentation of the evidence. The case, which centres on inconsistency, is 
a matter of legal technicality and therefore the business of the advocate as champion. 
And, if the basic strategy is to anticipate and defuse potential allegations of 
inconsistency, then the ‘case’ is crafted by drawing the potentialities of the refugee’s 
narrative, the self-presentational competences (or limitations) of the refugee, and the 
form of the witness statement into the aesthetic of inconsistency. But this ethical style 
works only if the client gives the barrister something to work with. In some 
situations the client is ‘inconsistent’ even in the case conference, and it becomes 
almost impossible for the barrister to develop a strategy that connects the witness 
statement to the self-presentation of the client. In extreme cases, where the refugee’s 
case is publicly funded, the barrister may have to form a professional judgement as 
to whether the case justifies further funding.    
 ]p1[Inconsistency also articulates the professional relationship between the 
barrister and the solicitor. Many barristers assumed a posture of detachment or 
relative objectivity, and hence claimed a particular insight into the documented case 
– or, more precisely, into the way that the contents of the file might play out in the 
agonistic frame of inconsistency. From this perspective, one question as the 
conference unfolds is whether a particular solicitor can be relied upon to have 
drafted a decent witness statement. As one barrister observed to us:  
 
]ex/[If you’ve got a solicitor you trust, you think, ‘You’ve done all this. I 
know these are all the grounds and I don’t need to poke or prod to find some 
more’. There are some solicitors where you think, ‘I don’t think these are all 
the grounds’. So actually in the conference you spend time poking and come 
out with two or three grounds that weren’t there before.]/ex[  
 
]p[The encounter between barrister and solicitor, which may be just one phase of an 
ongoing relationship, is inflected by the barrister’s sense of how the solicitor’s 
competences ‘measure up’ to the logic of inconsistency. 
 
 
 
]ha[Ecology 
]p[Most case conferences take place in barristers’ chambers, in rooms dedicated to 
the purpose. In less fancy chambers the conference room often doubles as a library or 
filing room; and, for clients at least, the experience of being enfolded in an archive 
has its own aesthetic effects. The conventional ecological formula for the conference 
is simple: three people sitting around a table. In one rather extreme situation, this 
prototypical infrastructure is expressed as hard architecture. The room set aside for 
lawyer-client meetings in the High Security Unit of HMP Belmarsh (the maximum-
security prison used to hold a number of those facing deportation or extradition for 
reasons related to national security) imposes a particular frame for interaction. The 
‘table’ is a solid cuboid structure that runs the entire length of the room, effectively 
dividing it in two. The lawyer, having been driven from the secure visiting area of 
the prison to the maximum-security unit in a van with darkened windows, enters the 
meeting room from one ‘side’, the client from the other. The solid table ensures that 
nothing can be passed between lawyer and client without being visible through the 
windows that run the length of each side, and who knows whether what is 
transacted verbally is not also open to scrutiny.9 In yet other situations, the 
conventionalized form of the conference has to be actualized in a context in which 
few or none of the usual props are available. One barrister with experience of 
working in both refugee law and criminal law told us of some of the peculiarities of 
criminal cases: 
 
 ]ex/[It’s slightly different, yeah, and a huge percentage of those conferences 
take place when you’re interviewing somebody in a room not much bigger 
than a disabled toilet, with no obvious furniture and a terrible smell. The first 
thing I was told, or one of the first things I was told when doing conferences in 
crime, is that when you open the wicket [the hatch on cell door], to speak to 
your client, make sure your face isn’t in front of the wicket because who knows 
what’s going to come out of that thing first. It might well be a fist, even if they 
know it’s you.]/ex[ 
 
 ]p1[So what is involved in sitting three people around a table? The 
‘arrangement of people’ (Sommer 1967: 145) is an obvious infrastructure of 
interaction, so obvious that it is easily overlooked. It is also, as it turns out, a resource 
for ethical performance. Even the most minimal equipment – again, a table and a few 
chairs – allows for degrees of proximity, opacity, or engagement, whether material or 
discursive, to be mobilized strategically. The case conference that we take as a 
narrative frame for this essay offers a particularly interesting example. The case in 
question was not a matter of refugee law because there was no question of 
persecution, but it mobilized the forms and strategies that we observed in other 
conferences. The client was facing deportation from the United Kingdom on the 
ground that he was a foreign national who had been convicted of a criminal offence. 
He had a British partner with whom he had two children, so deportation would have 
resulted in the separation of the family. The question, then, was whether deportation 
would amount to ‘disproportionate’ interference with his rights and the rights of his 
family within the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights. One of the 
children had learning difficulties, so the family had been supported by social services 
for some time. This kind of case no longer falls within the scope of legal aid 
provision, so the client was paying for representation himself, on the basis of a fixed 
fee arranged with the solicitor.  
 ]p1[About ten minutes after the client, his partner, and the solicitor arrive at 
the chambers, the barrister comes to the waiting area next to reception. She 
introduces herself very warmly; she smiles and addresses both the clients directly, 
shaking their hands. She and the solicitor know each other well, and they 
acknowledge each another very briefly. The barrister leads the solicitor and clients a 
short distance to the conference room, in which a large table is surrounded by a 
number of chairs. Water, biscuits, glasses, cups, and saucers are assembled on the 
table, and the barrister relays requests for tea and coffee to someone outside the 
room. The barrister is carrying the papers with her and she sets these up in front of 
her as she sits down. She asks the client to sit next to her – ‘Why don’t you sit here?’ 
He does so, and his partner takes a seat adjacent to him. This is perhaps the most 
interesting moment in the meeting. In most conferences the barrister automatically 
sits opposite the client and solicitor. This may be a vestige of tradition; some of our 
barristers referred to the solicitor and client as, respectively, the ‘professional client’ 
and the ‘lay client’. The usual seating arrangement is not inconsistent with 
expressions of empathy. One barrister suggested to us that she always sat opposite 
the client and the solicitor because ‘it would be a bit intimidating to have both 
lawyers on the other side of the table from you. It looks a bit like we’re opposed to 
them really’. But the ethical ecology of this particular conference is significantly 
different.  
 ]p1[After the meeting, the barrister told us why she preferred to sit next to 
her clients:  
 
]ex/[I don’t want to be an aloof barrister. I feel like, without fail, the clients I 
mainly have, you want to be as unintimidating and as much like a ‘real person’ 
as possible. So I think you want to be next to them. And it will be like this in 
the hearing, it will be me, and you, and that’s what you want to make them 
feel. You have to be like, I am going to be there, I am going to say this, you 
want them to feel like, oh my God, thank goodness she’s going to be the one, 
the wall, like the kind of solid … I don’t know, you’ve really got to try and 
make sure your clients feel confident in you. And you’ve got to know their case 
well before you meet them. Because if you don’t know … I think it really 
reassures a client when you come to your conference and you’re able to say it’s 
obvious that you know their whole case already. That makes them feel like, 
OK, she understands it … ]/ex[ 
 
 ]p1[Although her professional profile was similar to that of other asylum law 
barristers – young but relatively experienced, trained in the public service-orientated 
repertoire of public law, immigration law and criminal law – this barrister had 
(somewhat unusually) started out as a junior caseworker in a solicitor’s firm. As 
much as possible, she tried to model her professional style on this formative 
experience:  
 
]ex/[I think when I started in some ways I would have been better [at 
conferences] because as a caseworker I was very used to having client contact, 
and sometimes now I have to remind myself to slow down and explain, it 
can’t be me talking to another lawyer, and that’s so much of your time as a 
barrister is just talking to another lawyer, or a judge, and writing things.]/ex[ 
 
]p[This contrasts quite sharply with the style of the lawyer for whom the work of 
accompanying refugees, or of gaining their trust, was not part of her role, and who 
might well take a case without ever meeting the refugee him- or herself:  
 
]ex/[If credibility’s not an issue, I don’t ever want a conference. If [the Home 
Office] accept everything that’s been said, then it’s legal stuff, and unless [the 
client] can contribute to that, which is quite rare, there might be two or three 
questions they can help with but I’d always ask the solicitor for those, just 
phone them.]/ex[  
 
]p[Of course, there is more to an ethical style than the axis of proximity. In dealing 
with the client, one is also relating to the solicitor and documentation, and to each of 
these elements through the other. And a sustainable ethical style is one that holds 
together all these dimensions of the conference. 
 ]p1[In some of the conferences that we observed, the basic felicity condition 
for the barrister’s participation was opacity rather than proximity. Some practitioners 
preferred to sit opposite the client and the solicitor so that in the course of the 
conference they could discreetly check their email, or perhaps work on a more 
urgent case. One of our barristers deployed the material form of documents to 
strategic effect. Using a trick learned from his mentor, he would forest the papers 
with randomly placed Post-it notes to suggest close reading of the file, and he would 
seek to compound that impression by evoking one or two of the more obscure details 
of the case. He explained to us that ‘a real part of conferences is giving the 
impression of knowing the case better than the client. And clients are always in my 
experience impressed if they can see how well you’ve prepared for the meeting’. 
From the client’s point of view, the difference between opacity and proximity may 
not be decisive. After all, the barrister who made defensive use of Post-it notes also 
came up with the one of the more spectacular ‘resolutions’ of inconsistency in the 
course of a conference: noticing that a refugee had scars on his head which 
substantiated his story of having been beaten by police officers, and which explained 
why he was unable to recall his experiences in any consistent way.  
 
 
]ha[Agenda  
]p[To return to the conference that frames our discussion, the barrister begins by 
describing the spatial layout of the courtroom to the client: the judge will sit at the 
front behind a bench, the Home Office will have a table on one side of the room and 
they will have a table on the other side. She explains the order in which each party 
will speak, summarizes the roles of the Home Office Presenting Officer and the 
Immigration Judge, and her own role in the hearing. She emphasizes to the client 
that she is there to deal with all procedural issues and that if he has any questions or 
concerns during the case he can confer with her at any time. She then goes on to 
identify the central issue in the case:  ‘credibility’. She tells the client that although 
the issue has been explored quite extensively by the solicitor, it remains problematic: 
‘Basically, it means whether or not the judge accepts the facts as you put them, your 
version of events. In this particular case, your big credibility issue is going to be 
about the offence, so we'll focus on that today, because it will be difficult at the 
hearing’. Having flagged the question, the barrister then turns to a part of the file 
that contains a report by the social services on the children’s needs. She goes through 
the facts in the report with the client and checks that they are correctly recorded. The 
client’s partner adds some more details to the issues discussed in the report and the 
barrister makes further notes.  
 ]p1[This phase of the conference is quite conventional. It is usual for the 
barrister to set the agenda by identifying the central issue, and to spend the first few 
minutes checking certain details in the paperwork. In most of the conferences that we 
observed, the questions or issues to be covered in the conference were written on the 
last page of a (new and freshly opened) notepad, and from time to time the barrister 
would suspend the flow of note-taking and turn to this page to check the agenda. 
The (invariably blue) notepad mediates between the bundle of documents (which 
might be marked with Post-it notes to identify the most crucial parts) and the course 
of the conversation as it unfolds in the conference. The central document is a work in 
progress – the witness statement in which the contents of the refugee’s narrative are 
tuned and retuned in the light of a strategic judgement of how the narrative (and the 
narrator) might stand up to the forensic questioning of a Home Office Presenting 
Officer. At least for one barrister, the witness statement was the essential actor in the 
conference: 
 
]ex/[I don’t like conferences unless there’s already a witness statement. I know 
some solicitors like to take the client along in order to get a witness statement 
… I prefer to have a statement in front of me so I can cross-examine, effectively, 
the witness statement, check for gaps, errors, issues.]/ex[ 
 
]p[In cases where the participation of the refugee might give greater latitude to the 
Home Office, the barrister might seek to let the statement stand in for the client.  
 ]p1[The rather spare image in Figure 1, which is a photograph of the back 
page of one of these blue jotters, depicts a somewhat idiosyncratic conference plan.  
Instead of writing out an agenda, or a list of questions, on the last page of her 
notepad, this barrister draws a map of the courtroom. She then reproduces the image 
for the client in the course of the conference, step by step. As she draws each figure, 
and positions them in relation to the place that will be occupied by the client, she 
explains the role of each actor in the hearing, what they might be likely to do or say, 
and sounds out the client’s likely reactions or responses. This procedure works as a 
kind of mnemonic device for the barrister: from her perspective, each figure stands 
for a part of the case that is likely to be put to the client, so that the re-animation of 
the map within the frame of the conference recalls the points that she has identified 
in her reading of the draft witness statement. But the map is also an exemplary piece 
of ethical machinery. It is a device for rehearsing the experience of the trial with the 
client, for ‘walking them through’ the forthcoming hearing. The process of drawing 
out these minimalist figures, of situating, contextualizing, and explaining, brings the 
time of the hearing into the process of the conference. Rehearsal through topography 
casts the lawyer as empathetic champion, assures the client of her competence and 
mastery of the case, and realizes an affect of proximity that is, if anything, more 
intense than what is achieved by sitting alongside the client.  
 
]INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE[ 
 
 
 ]p1[To return to our conference, the barrister concludes the first phase of the 
meeting with a brief review of a further set of reports from social services about the 
likely effects of deportation on the welfare of the children. And here she addresses 
the solicitor directly:  
 
]ex/[These reports are good but we could use more. How many reviews were 
done in total? We should try to get the whole file – normally it is possible. 
Call up and request it from legal department, say you urgently need the file. 
There might be helpful notes. The problem is that the current report doesn't 
show the timing.]/ex[  
 
]p[The solicitor, who has been keeping notes on her laptop, makes a further note and 
agrees to look into the matter. The barrister goes on to remind her of the implications 
of a recent decision in which it was held that children might eventually adapt to life 
without a deported parent, and observes that it would be important to use 
psychological assessments of the family to meet that argument. In this collegial 
exchange, the solicitor figures as a productive collaborator, but it is clear that the 
barrister has the better insight into the case as it goes forward to the hearing. 
 ]p1[The barrister then turns to the crucial part of the case: the client’s account 
of the criminal offence. She automatically turns to the relevant pages of her file, but 
she proceeds to ask a series of focused questions without ever consulting the papers. 
Her tone remains friendly, but the tempo of the conference changes. In response to a 
question about a specific aspect of the conviction which had led to these deportation 
proceedings, the client offers a non-committal answer: ‘Not really’. At this point the 
barrister responds with a firm but non-confrontational challenge:  
 
]ex/[What do you mean by ‘not really’? Look, the problem is that you are 
minimizing your role … In your statement, it sounds like you didn’t even do 
anything. In the sentencing remarks from the trial, the judge says that you 
describe yourself as having let yourself be brought into a situation, but that 
you are not naïve ... So it was clearly not accepted that your basis of plea was 
just that you had no idea. So if you say it now, they won’t trust you. You 
obviously admitted something different before the court. It’s better to take full 
responsibility – and leave it at that. You did the sentence, you’re not going to 
reoffend, it was clearly a mistake. At the moment, your statement says 
something different.]/ex[  
 
]p[This is the point at which the aesthetic of inconsistency emerges most clearly in 
the course of the conference. The Home Office Presenting Officer or the judge will 
pick up on this contradiction between what the client admitted at his trial and what 
he says in the witness statement. The barrister begins the process of reformulating 
the statement by going back to the beginning, the better to satisfy herself of the 
possible grounds of inconsistency: ‘What happened with the offence? Start at 
beginning. How did you get into it?’ The documents drop away, and the conference 
turns into a rehearsal of cross-examination.  
 
 
 
]ha[Ethics 
]p[All of the barristers we talked to emphasized that they were bound by rules of 
professional conduct which prohibited the ‘coaching’ of witnesses – essentially, 
telling witnesses what they should say in court. The barrister who convened our 
sample conference offered us the clearest explanation of the rule:  
 
]ex/[You can always tell someone what to leave in and what to leave out of a 
statement, and what evidence will help their case and what won’t. What you 
can’t do is tell them to change their evidence. If they say, I said the car was 
black, and it would be better if it was blue, you can’t tell them to say it’s blue. 
You have to say, tell me the truth and I’ll tell you whether the truth is helpful 
or not helpful. And when the client asks, well what should I say, that’s when 
you have to be like, no I can’t help. I don’t think it’s that difficult. I don’t. I 
think that line is not that difficult to navigate.]/ex[ 
 
]p[When pressed on the question of where this rule was inscribed, or what its 
contents were, she responded somewhat vaguely: ‘Yeah, I think it is in … I don’t 
know where’. This is intriguing: the rule is recognized to be essential and binding, it 
is consistently practised, and yet none of the practitioners we worked with felt 
impelled to verify its provenance, content, or scope.  
 ]p1[The rule that proscribes rehearsal is indeed found in the Bar Council’s 
Code of Conduct: ‘You must not rehearse, practise with or coach a witness in respect 
of their evidence’. The handbook in which the Code of Conduct is contained runs to 
277 pages, of which only six are devoted to the rubric ‘Behaving ethically’; and 
whereas other rules in this rubric are glossed with commentaries and illustrations, 
this particular rule stands unadorned (Bar Standards Board 2014: 27-30). So even if 
practitioners were to look for a formal specification, they would not find very much. 
Here, we should recall what sociologies of the so-called ‘self-regulating’ professions 
have long suggested: that ethical rules function as a corporate parure, a documentary 
get-up by which the professional body impresses itself and others (see here Strathern 
2006). We are interested in the sense in which ‘ethics’ as a corpus of deontological 
principles is articulated by ‘ethos’ in the sense of professional style. We know that 
rules are learned through being lived, but these ethical rules of conduct are not lived 
(or mastered) in the same way as the technical rules of law or procedure that 
barristers mobilize in textual or oral argument.  
 ]p1[Our hypothesis is that the rule takes on a different depth or texture 
depending on the articulation of the logic of inconsistency with the perceived 
competences of the client and the ethical style of the lawyer. A number of barristers 
drew a distinction between the experts who are sometimes consulted in asylum cases 
and the regular refugee. Whereas experts were able to infer from a barrister’s line of 
questioning how they should deal with a Home Office Presenting Officer, many 
refugees lacked the competences to do this. So, as one put it, ‘You do try and fix that 
stuff as much as you can’. What are the limits to ‘fixing stuff’? 
 ]p1[At the point in our conference when the barrister’s questioning turns into 
a mode of cross-examination, the client’s answers become increasingly terse. When 
asked whether he was paid for his role in the offence of which he was convicted, he 
replies, ‘Not really’. At this point, the barrister offers further advice: 
 
]ex/[Just answer the question; stop trying to minimize. Let someone else judge 
it. Imagine how it comes across. You can be embarrassed, you can say you 
were embarrassed, but there is no point minimizing or misleading. You got a 
five-year sentence because it was a serious offence. You admitted you knew 
what you were doing. You can’t make it sound better now. It sounds best to 
say you accept it … The judge’s mind-set is constantly tuned to lying or not 
lying. And if you suggest in any way that you’re not being 100 per cent honest, 
they won’t like you; it’s insulting to them, and they won’t be sympathetic to 
your stressful situation and that you were motivated by your family.]/ex[  
 
]p[After this, the client relaxes a bit. He admits that some cash was seized, and that it 
was forfeited. Once this has been discussed, the barrister also seems happier. She has 
convinced the client to be more forthcoming; the statement can be redrafted and 
hopefully the client will offer more expansive and forthright answers if or when he is 
called to give evidence at the hearing. What has been negotiated here is the line 
between familiarization and inadmissible ‘rehearsal’ or ‘coaching’.  
 ]p1[How does one ‘fix’ inconsistency while remaining on the right side of the 
rule? One fairly consistent theme emerged from our conversations with barristers: 
‘There’s a difference between familiarizing someone with the likely procedure and 
the likely way that the evidence is going to be presented by the other side, and 
saying, “Look, you’re going to say x, y, and z’. Perhaps this can be construed as a 
difference between two modes of rehearsal: between putting the client in the picture 
about how things will unfold in court and instructing them on how to perform once 
they get there. For one of our barristers, telling a client how to dress for their 
appearance would count as coaching. Many of our informants invoked a criterion of 
truth: so, for instance, it would be permissible to say to a client, ‘Tell me the truth 
and I’ll tell you whether the truth is helpful or not’. Rehearsal would be anything 
that prompted the client to change a ‘true’ story. But the nature of inconsistency is 
such that what is in play is not truth as such but the ‘truth’ that emerges from the 
agonistic exchange of hypotheses and allegations. Again, inconsistency is ‘resolved’ 
not by ‘completing’ a narrative but by finding a strategy that anticipates and defuses 
the aspersion as to credibility that is implied by an allegation. In our conference, the 
barrister feels that she has properly judged that line.  
 ]p1[Concluding the conference, the barrister addresses the solicitor with a list 
of points that need further work. First, she recapitulates the elements of the case and 
identifies additions or amendments that should be made to the witness statement. 
Then she asks the solicitor to procure a full set of records from the social worker, to 
obtain a letter of support from a prospective employer, and to get hold of the 
children’s medical files and letters from their teachers. The conference concludes on a 
less than optimistic note: the barrister advises that although some Presenting Officers 
are fair, others are not, and although some Immigration Judges are sympathetic, the 
family should also ‘prepare for the worst’. When the clients have left, the solicitor 
and barrister fix a time for their next conversation about the case.  
 
 
 
]ha[Passing  
]p[In his account of law-making in the Conseil d’État, Bruno Latour observes that 
law is not truly a sociotechnical enterprise. The media of lawyering – speech and text 
– have remained essentially the same for two millennia, and these media lack the 
capacity to ‘inflect’ action in the manner of even the most basic technological 
artefacts (Latour 2006: chap. 5). One might suggest in response that communicative 
media – in law as elsewhere – have precisely the capacities of inflection that Latour 
reserves for technological devices. An example can be found in his ethnography of 
the Conseil. In the course of rendering judgement, the conseillers felt obliged to 
respect a time-honoured convention of hesitation: ‘for [justice] to speak justly, she 
must have hesitated’ (Latour 2006: 152). In debate, the judges sought to convince 
themselves that they had hesitated for long enough to sound out the full scope for 
decision that was afforded by precedent and policy, or to ensure that the decision 
was properly reasoned. It would be interesting to pursue Latour’s analysis 
somewhat further, and to explore the variability of the convention. How does the 
duration of hesitation vary, how does its inflection of the decision change, according 
to the character of the tribunal or the case? What of those cases in which judges do 
not hesitate, the better to affirm the rightness of the decision or the more 
peremptorily to reject the pretensions of one of the parties? But the essential point is 
that the time of hesitation, its measure or texture, is not chronometric: ‘long enough’ 
is not a matter of minutes or seconds.  
 ]p1[The forensic sense of time emerges from the way that the judges, as 
agents of the convention, ‘perform’ duration so as to engage the expectations of the 
public, and these expectations are ethopoietic artefacts – effects of the way that the 
judges see themselves being seen by this (virtual) public. In the process of hesitating, 
the judges mobilize or inflect time in such a way as to turn it into something other 
than itself. The ‘time’ that functions as a variable or emergent felicity condition for 
the formulation and enunciation of judgement is generated by the process of 
communication, by the reflexive performance of hesitation for an addressee (the 
virtual ‘body’ of the court, or a public). This is inflection within the ancient medium 
of ‘talk’. It is interesting to dwell on the formula that Latour uses to characterize the 
moment of decision, or the moment in which an ethical moment is capitalized to the 
benefit of a mode of enunciation: ‘law passes’. 
 ]p1[In asylum and immigration cases, the machinery through which law 
‘passes’ is configured by the aesthetic of inconsistency; documents, ecologies, ethical 
dispositions, professional strategies, and conceptual forms are actualized and 
connected along lines of force or tension that are generated by ‘inconsistency’. The 
ethos or style of the barrister, which is manifested in such things as the disposition of 
chairs, the handling of files, or the ethical care with which clients are engaged, 
evolves as a resource for making this machinery more ‘liveable’ for both the lawyer 
and the client. But, as in Latour’s example, the lawyer’s ethical style is itself 
implicated in the articulation of the protocol through which law passes. To begin 
with, inconsistency is the aesthetic that discloses the elements of the case to the 
barrister, and which conditions how she positions herself (spatially, ethically, 
cognitively) in relation to her client. It is the frame that prompts and shapes the 
evolution of a lawyerly style: ‘Lawyers adjust to the procedural regimes that they 
regularly attend to. The regime serves as the frame that tells apart good from bad 
practice, successful from failing strategies, available from unavailable 
communications, and useless from useful information’ (Scheffer 2007: 71). And, 
within the frame of a particular case or a particular conference, this lawyerly ethos 
conditions how, in the real time of rehearsal, the barrister senses the emergence of 
actual or potential ‘gaps’ in the evidence, these ‘gaps’ being a function of the 
barrister’s perception of how the material and ‘human’ resources that make up the 
evidence will play out in court. Ultimately, an ethical style is capitalized in the 
‘passing’ of asylum procedure. This is not surprising: ethical ‘equipment’ (Rabinow 
2003) is necessarily bound up in the world from which it seeks to take its distance. 
And, to return to our opening sentence, it may be that ‘martyrdom’ or ‘irony’ is just 
the most resilient device for acknowledging that implication. 
 
]hx[NOTES 
The authors wish to thank the participants, both lawyers and clients, for the time, 
confidence, and insights that made this research possible. 
]nt[ 1 In the United Kingdom, about 60 per cent of applications for asylum are denied by the 
Home Office. Of those who are receive a refusal letter, most will appeal to a tribunal, where 
about 25 per cent are successful (House of Commons, ‘Asylum statistics’; figures are for 
2013).  
 2 Scheffer is interested in ‘the regularities and routines ‘of styles: ‘Why, one may wonder, do 
lawyers sustain their respective styles across a broad range of cases, clients, and legal 
matters?’ (2007: 70). 
 3 According to an archaic sense, people are not the only agents that can be ‘convened’; the 
Oxford English Dictionary (s.v. convene) offers an illustrative quotation from Robert Boyle’s 
The origin of forms and qualities (1666): ‘The wise Author of Things did, by guiding the first 
motions of the small parts of Matter, bring them to convene after the manner requisite to 
compose the World’. 
 4 Scheffer’s association of habitus with infrastructure suggests an interesting inflection of the 
old theme of ethos/habitus. Ethos or habitus is not a form of interiorized capitalized 
experience, which is actualized in engagements in a ‘field’; it is an effect of the co-articulation 
of material, semantic, and psychic forms. This is not the sense of habitus that one finds in 
work of Pierre Bourdieu. That particular sense, which has a long history, involves a particular 
set of tropes: in habitus, experience is capitalized as equipment for agency in the present; 
habitus somehow articulates potentiality into actuality, or convention into invention; habitus 
is observable only in its actualization, so that (sociologically or ethnographically) the ‘field’ 
functions as the medium in which virtual capacities are both actualized and disclosed to 
observation (see the classic analysis in Héran 1987). So in the tradition that Bourdieu draws 
upon, ethos/habitus becomes observable when a virtual, interior, competence is actualized in 
or as a set of observable transactions.  
 5 The Refugee Convention provides that asylum should be granted where the applicant has a 
‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
[adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954] 189 UNTS 137 [Refugee Convention], 
art. 1A). The (rarely observed) principle is that the authorities have to assist the refugee in 
making their case. 
 6 In their analysis of how this information is actually used, Gibb and Good observe that for 
the Home Office the primary aim is ‘to anticipate and pre-empt rival arguments rather than 
assess the overall country situation’, so that country of origin information ‘risks being treated 
as a set of discrete snippets, with little attempt to link one factoid to another, still less to 
construct a structured, multi-dimensional picture of the country situation’ (2013: 303-4). 
 7 For an example, see Luker (2013). 
 8 In his study of appeal hearings in France, Dequen reports the observations of a judge who, 
having formed the impression that an applicant was too ‘detached’ in telling the story of how 
her young son had been crushed to death by a tank, was then convinced when the applicant 
recalled seeing next to the body a chocolate bar that the child’s father had bought for him 
earlier that day: ‘One can’t invent this; these are the details that make a story credible or not’ 
(cited in Dequen 2013: 461).  
 9 In the course of the hearing in the case of Belhadj & Others v. The Security Service, SIS, GCHQ, 
Home Office and FCO (2015) IPT/13/132-9/H, it was revealed that legally privileged 
communications between lawyers and clients in national security cases have indeed been 
intercepted.  
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